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MODIFICATIONS OF RULES 13e-4 AND 14d-8:
A LIMITED EQUAL FOOTING OPPORTUNITY
In January of 1986, the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC")
adopted amendments to rule 13e-4 1 that conform the time periods for
proration,' withdrawal rights3 and length of issuer self-tender offers 4 to
those time periods required of third party bids.5 The SEC believes that
the shorter time periods for issuers under the current scheme place the
third party bidder at an unfair disadvantage in a bidding war. Before the
amendments became effective, the issuer could lock-in 6 tendering share-
holders and begin buying shares before the third party bidder, even if the
third party initiated a tender offer before the issuer.7 By conforming the
time periods, the SEC is attempting to place the issuer and third party on
"equal footing." 8 As a practical matter, however, issuer and third party
1. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4 (1985).
2. Partial tender offers often are oversubscribed. In that case, SEC rules 13e-4(f)(3) and 14d-8
provide that the issuer or third party offeror prorate its purchases over all those securities tendered
within a specified period (10 days for issuer tender offers and 20 days for third party offers). Addi-
tionally, the proration period is extended if the bidder increases the consideration offered. See 17
C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(3) & 14d-8 (1985).
3. Rules 13e-4(f)(2)(i) and 14d-7(a)(1) provide for initial withdrawal periods of 10 and 15
days respectively. During that time, a security holder who has tendered shares to the bidder may
demand return of his shares. See 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(2)(i) & 14d-7(a)(1) (1985). Rules 13e-
4(f)(2)(ii) and 14d-7(a)(2) extend the withdrawal periods for issuers and third party bidders when
another party makes a tender offer. See 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(2)(ii) & 14d-7(a)(2) (1985).
4. Currently, the issuer must keep its tender offer open for a minimum 15-day period. 17
C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(1) (1985). Third party tender offerors have a minimum 20-day offering period.
17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a) (1985).
5. The final amendments appear in 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4 (1985); see also SEC Sec. Exch. Act
Rel. No. 34-22788, 18 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 125 (Jan. 14, 1986).
6. Tendering shareholders become "locked-in" to a tender offer when their withdrawal rights
expire. In an issuer tender offer, for example, a shareholder who tenders immediately after the
tender offer begins has 10 days in which to demand return of his shares. After the tenth day, the
issuer has the unqualified right to decide whether to consummate the sale. Of course, a shareholder
who tenders after the tenth day becomes "locked-in" immediately and has no withdrawal rights.
7. A tender offeror can begin buying shares as soon as withdrawal and proration rights expire.
Even though the rules require that a tender offer continue to remain open after the expiration of
withdrawal and proration rights, the tender offeror knows at that time how many sales must be
prorated. Shareholders tendering later risk locking-in their shares on a deal that the tender offeror
may decide not to consummate.
8. One of the major concerns of the Williams Act, under which these tender offer rules are
promulgated, is "to avoid favoring neither management or the takeover bidder." Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1982). The SEC believes that the amendments will bring issuers and
third party bidders "closer to equal footing." SEC Sec. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 34-22199, 17 SEc. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 1310, 1312 (July 1, 1985) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release 34-22199].
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bidders will rarely stand on "equal footing." Even under amended rule
13e-4, one party will almost always be able to lock-in tendering share-
holders and begin purchases before the other.9
The SEC's authority to regulate tender offers derives from the Wil-
liams Act amendments to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 10 In enact-
ing the Williams Act, Congress recognized that investors need a
minimum amount of unpressured time in which to consider the merits of
a tender offer.' Section 14 of the Act explicitly provides shareholders
ten unpressured days to evaluate the tender offer 2 without losing the
opportunity to participate, 13 on a pro rata basis, with other tendering
9. "Equal footing" can only mean that the issuer and third party begin purchasing shares
simultaneously. In the context of a step-by-step bidding war, one party will always be able to begin
purchasing shares before the other under the proposed amendments. Only in the fortuitious event
that the issuer and third party make bids on the same day can they begin purchasing simultaneously.
10. The Williams Act added new §§ 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e) and 14(f) to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
11. The 1967 Senate Report states:
The competence and integrity of a company's management and of those persons who seek
management positions, are of vital importance to stockholders. Secrecy in this area is in-
consistent with the expectations of the people who invest in the securities of publicly held
corporations and impair public confidence in securities as a medium of investment.
S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. In addition,
Congress heard testimony about the need to insure sufficient time to make an investment decision in
order to avoid undue pressure on shareholders during a tender offer. See generally Hearings on S.
510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967) (statement of Hon. Manual F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
12. Section 14(d)(5) reads, in pertinent part,
Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders may be
withdrawn by or on behalf of the depositor at any time until the expiration of seven days
after the time definitive copies of the offer or request or invitation are first published or sent
or given to security holders....
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
In addition, withdrawal rights are revived after 60 days from the date of the original tender offer.
Id. Between the seventh day and the sixtieth day, however, tendered shares are "locked-in." The
tender offeror then has a statutory period of 53 days in which to consider whether to consummate
sales with those shares tendered without fear of withdrawal by the shareholders. See supra note 6.
However, § 14(d)(5) authorizes the SEC to prescribe rules and regulations as "necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982).
13. Section 10(d)(6) reads, in pertinent part,
Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or invitation for tenders, for less than
all the outstanding equity securities of a class, atid where a greater number of securities is
deposited pursuant thereto within ten days after copies of the offer or request or invitation
are first published or sent or given to security holders than such person is bound or willing
to take up and pay for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly as may be pro
rata.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). Moreover, there is a 10-day pro rate period upon an increase in the
consideration offered to security holders. Id.
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shareholders.' 4 The provision also allows tendering shareholders seven
days to withdraw a previous decision to tender.1 5 Morever, section 14
grants investors an additional ten days of pro rata participation rights
following an increase in consideration by the tender offeror.16
Because tender offers usually involve a contest for control of a corpo-
ration, 7 Congress tried to avoid favoring either management or the
outside tender offeror.1t Before the SEC began to regulate issuer self-
tender offers in 1979, however, the securities laws explicitly excluded is-
suers from the minimum withdrawal and time periods that apply to third
party tender offerors.19 Under section 14 of the Williams Act, for exam-
ple, issuers could initiate "short-fuse" self-tender offers and pressure
shareholders to tender quickly, thereby defeating the third party tender
offeror before he had a chance to begin buying shares." The exclusion of
14. The tender offeror cannot begin buying shares until the shareholders' proration rights ex-
pire. Only then does it know whether and how it must prorate purchases.
15. Of course, a shareholder is under no compulsion to tender hastily because by statute he can
participate on a pro rata basis for 10 days. See supra notes 12 and 14. Shareholders tendering after
the seventh day, however, have no right to withdraw their shares. See supra note 13.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982).
17. Hearings, supra note 11, at 115-16. An outside tender offeror is always trying to wrest
control from current management. An issuer, by contrast, does not always initiate a self-tender offer
as a way to defend itself in a fight for control.
18. The 1967 Senate Report states that Congress took
[E]xtreme care to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or
in favor of the person making the takeover bid. The bill is designed to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors while at the same time providing the offeror and
management equal opportunity to fairly present their case.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
19. Section 14(8)(B) exempts "any offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of, any security
by the issuer of such security... " from the provisions of § 14(d) of the Williams Act. In 1968,
Congress did not view issuer self-tender offers as attempts to gain or maintain corporate control.
Issuers often purchase their own securities for a variety of corporate purposes: (1) to reduce the
number of shares of a class of securities outstanding, (2) to fund employee stock option or stock
purchase plans, or (3) to issue stock in a merger with another company. See SEC Release 34-22199,
supra note 8. See also Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited
Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545 (1980).
20. No minimum withdrawal or proration rights pertain to issuer tender offers under the Act.
Section 14(d)(8)(B) of the Act exempts issuer tender offers from the provisions of § 14(d). See supra
note 19. Section 13(e) governs issuer self-tender offers but provides for no minimum withdrawal and
proration periods. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1982). Section 13(e) only makes it unlawful for an issuer
with a class of equity securities registered pursuant to § 12 to purchase its equity securities in contra-
vention of rules adopted by the Commission "to define acts and practices which are fraudulent,
deceptive or manipulative" and "to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent such acts and
practices." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1) (1982). During hearings prior to the enactment of the Williams
Act, the SEC emphasized that "an issuer making such a tender offer probably should disclose sub-
stantially more information with respect to its own business and prospects than can reasonably be
Washington University Open Scholarship
570 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:567
issuers from the requirements of section 14 reflected two understandings:
(1) in 1968, when Congress enacted the Williams Act, issuers did not use
the self-tender offers as a defensive tactic2' and (2) that issuers repur-
chase shares for business reasons irrelevant to a contest for control.22
While third party offers always involve a contest for control, issuer self-
tender offers have many purposes.
In 1979, however, the SEC decided to regulate issuer self-tender offers
in the same way that the Williams Act explicitly regulates third party
tender offers.23 By adopting rule 13e-4, the Commission extended with-
drawal and pro rata rights to issuer self-tender offers. Rule 13e-4 pro-
vided ten-day withdrawal24 and pro rata periods25 and an additional ten-
day pro rata period upon an increase in consideration by the issuer.26
Moreover, rule 13e-4 required an additional ten-day withdrawal period if
an outside bidder initiates a competitive tender offer.27
Rule 13e-4 also established a minimum offering period of fifteen days28
or, if the issuer made a self-tender offer in anticipation of or in response
to a third party tender offer, twenty days.29 In the latter case, however,
the initial ten-day pro rata period still applied. Although the self-tender
expected of a third party [tender offeror]." Supplemental Memorandum of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission with Respect to Certain Comments on S. 510, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 202 (1967).
21. See supra note 19.
22. Id. Nathan and Sobel cite various economic reasons for issuer stock repurchase plans:
(1) favorable effects on earnings, (2) favorable effects on book value per share, (3) financial benefits of
increased leverage particularly in an inflationary era, and (4) reduction of aggregate dividend costs
and shareholder servicing costs. Nathan & Sobel, supra note 19, at 1545. Until the SEC promul-
gated rule 13e-4, the only regulation of issuer tender offers was pursuant to the antifraud provisions
of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (1985).
23. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e (1985); SEC Sec. Act. No. 33-6108 (Aug. 17, 1979). The rule was pat-
terned on § 14(d) of the 1934 Act. The SEC asserted that § 13(e) did limit its authority to disclosure
requirements involving issuer tender offers. 17 C.F.R. 240.13(e) (1985); SEC Sec. Exch. Act No. 34-
14185, 42 Fed. Reg. 60,090 (Nov. 23, 1977). The SEC emphasized that in adopting rules for the
protection of investors and in the public interest to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent
fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices, SEC rulemaking power under § 13(e) may
include substantive provisions as well as disclosure requirements. Id.
24. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(2)(i) (1985).
25. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(3) (1985).
26. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(3) (1985).
27. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(2)(ii) (1985). This provision adds a very significant element to in-
vestor protection during a contest for control. Under the statutory scheme, "locked-in" sharehold-
ers would not be able to consider the offer by a new tender offeror. See supra notes 6 & 12-15.
28. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(1) (1985). The minimum offering period does not mean that with-
drawal and pro rata rights are cotermimous. After pro rate rights expire, a shareholder may not
necessarily procure a sale to the tender offeror no matter how long the offer remains open.
29. 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a) (1985).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/8
Number 2] RULE 13E-4 AND 14D-8 AMENDMENTS
offer remained open for twenty days, rule 13e-4 effectively required the
investor to decide by the end of the ten-day proration period if he wanted
to participate equally with other shareholders.
31
Soon after the adoption of rule 13e-4, the SEC promulgated rule 14d-8,
which expanded the statutory provisions of section 14(d) of the Williams
Act." Rule 14d-8 required all third party tender offers to remain open
for a minimum of twenty business days. 32 The rule further provided a
fifteen-business-day initial withdrawal period,33 rather than seven days as
in section 14(d),34 and a twenty-business-day proration period.3 5 There-
fore, an outside tender offeror could not lock in 36 any tendered shares for
fifteen business days or begin buying shares for twenty business days after
the offer's inception.37 Taken together, rules 13e-4 and 14d-8 asserted
that investors need more time to consider outside tender offers than to
consider self-tender offers. 38 By granting investors a ten-day period of
unpressured time to consider issuer self-tender offers, however, rule 13e-4
did offer additional shareholder protection.39
In the context of an issuer/third-party bidding war, however, rules
13e-4 and 14d-8 gave the issuer a significant advantage in initiating a
defensive stock repurchase program. An issuer could counter a third
30. The SEC recognizes the critical importance of the proration period to the security holder.
A security holder must realistically choose and implement one of three investment options before the
proration period ends: (1) tender to the bidder in order to be sure of participating in the tender offer;
(2) sell on the open market at prices reflecting the tender offer price, the risks of proration and the
likelihood of competing bids; or (3) hold and remain a security holder of the subject company at least
for the immediate future. Failure to select one of these three options before the expiration period
essentially means the security holder chooses the third option. The first and second options disap-
pear at the end of the proration period if the offer is oversubscribed. SEC Sec. Exch. Act No. 34-
18761, 47 Fed. Reg. 24,338 (June 4, 1982) (concerning rules governing third party tender offers).
31 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (1985).
32 17 C.F.R. 240.14e-l(a) (1985).
33. 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1985).
34. See supra note 12.
35, 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-8 (1985).
36. See supra notes 6 & 12-15.
37. The tender offeror cannot begin purchasing until it knows if and how it must prorate
purchases.
38. See supra notes 12-13 & 20. Section 14(d) provides no minimum periods for issuer self-
tender offers. This timing priority does not necessarily establish a presumption that investors need
more time to consider third party tender offers. It merely suggests a presumption that investors need
more time to consider competing offers in a contest for control than to consider an issuer's repur-
chase program based on nondefensive, pure economic reasons. See supra notes 19 & 22.
39. See SEC See. Exch. Act. Rel. No. 34-16112 (Aug. 16, 1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 49406 (Aug. 22,
1979) (withdrawal rights protect shareholders from being pressured into accepting the tender offer
prior to the time all material facts relating to the tender offer are fully disclosed and disseminated).
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party bid and still begin repurchasing shares before the third party could
purchase shares.' Thus, the issuer could create substantial uncertainty
as to the values that will remain in the company for security holders who
do not tender to the issuer.4" The timing disparities between rules 13e-4
and 14d-8 pressured security holders to tender quickly into the issuer's
hands and thereby prevented security holders from receiving the protec-
tion of the twenty-day proration period for third party tender offers.4 2 In
other words, the rules put the issuer and third party on equal footing and
created the sort of pressured investment decisions that SEC rules should
prevent.43
Of course, the present regulatory scheme only mirrors the legitimate
scheme. The Williams Act established minimum withdrawal and prora-
tion periods for third party tender offers but left issuers unregulated. 44
Because the SEC believed that issuers too frequently used these timing
advantages to defend themselves against third party tender offerors
rather than to accomplish legitimate economic goals, 45 the SEC amended
rule 13e-4 to conform the time periods for issuer tender offers to those
40. To succeed in thwarting a third party bidder, the issuer must repurchase stock as quickly as
possible. See Nathan & Sobel, supra note 19, at 1557. Under the current rules, for example, the
third party bidder makes a tender offer on day one. The issuer can make an offer as late as day nine
and still begin purchasing shares before the third party bidder. The proration and withdrawal rights
for the issuer's bid would expire on day 19 of the third party's bid. Of course, the proration rights
for the third party do not expire until day 20.
41. See SEC Release 34-22199, at 1314. An issuer stock repurchase program may make the
issuer less attractive as a target for potential or existing raiders by eliminating excess cash and/or
increasing debt. In this way, the issuer can remove the incentive for a "bootstrap" acquisition. In a
"boot-strap" acquisition, the raider repays a significant portion of the cost of acquisition by refinanc-
ing his acquisition debt using the target's credit.
42. See 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4 & 240.14d-8 (1985); SEC Release No. 34-22199, supra note 8 at
1314.
43. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633-34. The Supreme Court stated that the regu-
lations under the Williams Act should permit investors to make well-informed, unpressured invest-
ment decisions. Additionally, the rules should favor neither management nor the takeover bidder.
Id. The SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers has recommended that "[t]akeover regulation
should not favor either the acquiror or the target company, but should aim to achieve a reasonable
balance while at the same time protecting the interests of shareholders and the integrity and effi-
ciency of the markets." SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers: Report ofRecommendations,
Recommendation 3 at 15 (July 8, 1983).
44. See supra note 38.
45. SEC Release 34-22199, supra note 8, at 1311 (1985). An issuer can make a tender offer in
anticipation of possible hostile tender offers, especially when third parties have filed statements
under § 13(d) of the Exchange Act of 1934. Section 13(d) requires the filing of statements by parties
who have acquired more than five percent of the issuer's securities. The SEC notes that these defen-
sive issuer tender offers are often for a greater percentage of the issuer's outstanding securities than
issuer tender offers made in uncontested situations. Id. at 1311 (1985).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/8
RULE 13E-4 AND 14D-8 AMENDMENTS
applicable to third party tender offers.4 6 Under these amendments, the
issuer can get a timing advantage over a third party bidder only by initi-
ating a self-tender offer before the third party makes a bid.
47
The proposed amendments offer a superficial simplicity to tender offer
regulation, but this simplicity belies two problems. First, absent the for-
tuity of simultaneous bids, bidders will usually initiate tender offers on
successive days, and one bidder will ultimately be able to purchase shares
before the other. The ability to purchase shares before a rival bidder can
purchase confers a tremendous advantage. If the first bidder can lock up
enough tendered shares and consummate enough sales before the subse-
quent bidder can begin purchasing, then the first bidder may defeat the
second bidder regardless of the merits of the second bidder's offer.48 Ul-
timately, bidders will not stand on "equal footing," as Congress hoped
they would.49
Second, the staggering of time periods exists only because bidders initi-
ate tender offers on different days and bears no rational relation to inves-
tor protection.5° When two or more bidders have initiated tender offers,
shareholders effectively must make their decisions by the time the with-
drawal and proration periods expire for the earliest bidder. Shareholders
must compare these options all at once, not in isolated time sequences.
After the earliest bidder's proration period expires, nontendering share-
holders may tender to a subsequent bidder. Consummation of a sale,
however, hinges on the success or failure of the first bidder, who has
already begun to purchase shares.5" The proration and purchase delay
46. 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4 (1985); SEC Release 34-22199, supra note 8.
47. Id. at 1314.
48. Id.
49. Of course, the Williams Act itself never provided for uniform withdrawal and proration
periods for third party tender offerors and issuers. See supra notes 12-13 & 19-20.
50. Id. Of course, one can certainly argue that even with a uniform set of rules, the interplay of
withdrawal, proration and offering time periods is very complicated and confusing.
51. See, e.g., SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985). In Carter
Hawley Hale, The Limited commenced a cash tender offer on April 4, 1984 to begin purchasing
shares. Carter Hawley Hale, the target, began a repurchase program on April 16 and by April 24
had repurchased more than 50% of its stock. By then, Carter Hawley Hale's repurchasing had
raised the market price of the stock over The Limited's cash tender offer price. The Limited soon
abandoned its efforts to gain control of Carter Hawley Hale. The Carter Hawley Hale repurchase
program did not even qualify as a tender offer subject to rule 13e-4 because Carter Hawley Hale was
able to negotiate block purchases of stock on a private basis. Id. at 948-53 (rejecting the argument
that all substantial repurchases constitute tender offers and adopting an 8-factor test to determine
whether a repurchase program constitutes a tender offer). Nevertheless, the case demonstrates the
great defensive power in being able to begin purchasing first.
Number 21
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imposed on subsequent bidders has no justification if shareholders must
effectively choose by the time the first bidder can begin purchasing.52
Ideally, competing tender offers, whether issuers or third party bid-
ders, ought to have enough time to develop the merits of their offers and
begin buying shares simultaneously. In political elections one candidate
cannot lock up votes before the other candidates; voters must choose be-
tween all contenders on the same day. The SEC likewise could imple-
ment a flexible time scale that, within the limitations of the market place,
would give tender offerors some opportunity to begin buying shares
simultaneously.
The following modifications to rules 13e-4 and 14d-8 are offered as a
model for a limited "equal footing" opportunity. The model would give
any subsequent tender offeror, whether an issuer or a third party, the
option of adopting the initial withdrawal, proration and offering periods
of any prior tender offeror if it meets the following requirements:
(1) A subsequent tender offeror must make at least two bids by the eighth
business day following the initiation of a tender offer by the prior
tender offeror.
(2) Each subsequent tender offeror's bid must be made at least two busi-
ness days apart.
(3) For purposes of this option, a "bid" may consist of a reaffirmation of a
prior bid.
(4) The subsequent tender offeror, in its public tender offer announce-
ment, must identify the prior tender offeror whose initial time periods
it wishes to adopt and must give the dates on which each initial period
for withdrawal, proration and length of offer will expire.
As a necessary corollary to this option, a minimum initial withdrawal
period of twenty days, applicable to all tender offerors, would be estab-
lished. This provision would obviate conflicts between the current fif-
teen-day period,53 the proposed option and the provision that an increase
in consideration triggers a ten day withdrawal period. 4
The following example will clarify application of the rule modification.
52. If the second tender offer must wait another six or 10 days after the first offeror has begun
purchasing, the investor is not receiving any additional protection from that time period. Assuming
each tender offeror has made full disclosure, the investor compares the two in the 10 days allotted for
that comparison. See 17 C.F.R. 240.13e-4(f)(2)(ii) (1985). If the investor chooses the second bid-
der's offer, why must he wait the extra time to consummate a sale? If the first bidder's buying
activity is strong enough in the interim, the second bidder may withdraw his offer altogether. See
Carter Hawley Hale, 760 F.2d 945.
53. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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Assume tender offeror X initiates a tender offer on business day one.
Tender offeror Y must initiate a tender offer by business day six to take
advantage of the "flexi-time" option. Between business days six and
eight, tender offeror X can respond or remain silent. In any case, on
business day eight, tender offeror Y must either change its first bid or
reaffirm the bid. Tender offeror X then has two days, until business day
ten, to respond without triggering an extension of its withdrawal, prora-
tion, or offering time periods. Assuming tender offerors X and Y do not
further develop their bids beyond business day ten, they will both be able
to buy shares simultaneously, on business day twenty-one. Furthermore,
if a third tender offeror initiates a bid after business day ten, then rules
13e-4(f)(2)(ii) and 14d-7(a)(2) would trigger an additional withdrawal
period applicable to offerors X and Y equally. Beyond business day ten,
however, either tender offeror X or Y may forfeit its equal footing with
the other if it changes its bid and triggers extensions of its withdrawal
and proration periods. Thus, subsequent tender offerors cannot extend
offering periods indefinitely by changing their existing bid. In all cases,
the proposal offers shareholders a minimum of ten business days to either
compare competing bids or withdraw a previous acceptance.
The numerical requirements of the option serve four purposes. First,
the two-bid requirement" will encourage competing tender offerors to
communicate several times.56 Second, the two day requirement57 ensures
that the prior tender offeror will have some minimum time in which to
respond to the subsequent tender offeror. Third, the eight-day require-
ment ensures that the prior tender offeror will have the last opportunity
to respond without incurring time disadvantages. This result neutralizes
any disincentive to be the first tender offeror.58 Finally, the combination
55. See § 1 of the proposal.
56. The proposal's basic goal is to approximate the auctioneering model. That is, tender offer-
ors should be able to make a series of bids without the concern of triggering extensions of the pro
rata and withdrawal periods applicable to their bids.
57. See § 2 of the proposal.
58. If the subsequent tender offeror could wait until the tenth day to make a bid, the prior
tender offeror could respond only by triggering extensions of his pro rata and withdrawal time pe-
riod. Thus, the prior tender offeror would have little incentive for initiating the bidding process in
the first place. The subsequent tender offeror would have too much advantage: (1) he would adopt
the prior tender offeror's time period, (2) he would know what he must do to top the prior tender
offer's bid, and (3) the prior tender offeror would as a practical matter have to respond after the
tenth day and thus incur timing disadvantages. The eighth-day requirement balances the incentives
between both tender offerors. The subsequent tender offeror has the opportunity to adopt the prior
tender offeror's time periods, but the prior tender offeror has the last opportunity to respond without
incurring timing disadvantages.
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of the two-day requirement and eight-day requirement ensure that the
prior tender offeror will have at least two days to respond to a subsequent
tender offeror.
The proposal outlined above is workable because it does not discrimi-
nate in favor of previous tender offerors and, in all cases, allows share-
holders a minimum of ten business days to either compare competing
bids or withdraw acceptance. The proposal is also optional. The notice
requirement averts any danger that a subsequent tender offeror's adap-
tion of shorter time periods regarding withdrawal and probation rights
will confuse investors. Most important, the proposal lets tender offerors,
if they wish, stand on equal footing in a contest for control without ex-
tending the process indefinitely. Within the confines of the marketplace,
the Commission can infuse democracy into tender offer battles. The Wil-
liams Act should protect investors, and simultaneously avoid favoring
either management or third party tender offerors.
Richard L. Green
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